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Hake is the most valuable fisheries species in South Africa, with an estimated landed 
value of R658 million in 1997.  The fishery is presently managed under an individual 
quota system, where total allowable catch (TAC) is set annually and divided up 
amongst quota holders according to past performance, without quota holders having 
to pay for it.  Fundamental restructuring of the South African hake quota market is 
however due to take place in the near future as recommended by the White Paper on 
Marine Fisheries Policy (1997).  Factor analysis of data collected from a postal survey 
of existing South African hake quota holders and rejected hake quota applicants 
suggests that distinct differences in attitudes towards restructuring exist amongst 
respondents.  Four factors, representing groups of respondents defined as (1) 
applicants, (2) quota holders, (3) small scale respondents (comprising of both 
applicants and quota holders), and (4) larger, longer established quota holders, 
sharing similar attitudes towards restructuring were extracted.  It was also calculated 
that a substantial annual rent of approximately R279 million is generated by the 
South African hake industry, which is presently harvested free of charge by those 
issued with quota.  It is stated policy of the White Paper to capture these rents, 
however methods of accomplishing this have not been well accepted by the industry. 
This study aims at providing some solutions to these problems of restructuring. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Hake is the most valuable fisheries species in South Africa, with an estimated 
landed value of R658 million in 1997(1996 landed mass has been used in 
conjunction with 1997 prices) (De Swart, 1998).  Quota allocation for Hake, 
along with other fisheries, has been targeted for restructuring according to the 
White Paper on Marine Fishery Policy (Marine Fisheries Policy for South 
Africa, 1997).  At present the fishery is managed under an individual quota 
system, where total allowable catch (TAC) is set annually and divided up 
amongst quota holders free of charge according to past performance.  However 
the stated objectives of the White Paper include inter alia the following: 
 
•  Quota will be issued as a percentage of TAC,  
 
•  Quota rights will have to be purchased via a public tender in a once-off 




highest bid), with the purchase price, including the cost of managing the 
resource, being paid annually, 
 
•  The right will be divisible, transferable and inheritable, with a ceiling on 
maximum tonnage associated with a single quota holder,  
 
•  The right will revert back to the State within the allotted period, for 
example, a maximum term of 50 years will revert at a rate of two percent per 
year and a minimum term of ten years will revert at a rate of ten percent per 
year, i.e., the entire quota share purchased will reverted back to the state 
over the allotted period, and  
 
•  As not all participants may wish to acquire long-term rights, provision is 
made for the establishment of a commercial public company to enable 
industry participants to lease rights for a shorter time period of one or more 
seasons.  The above mentioned company will then lease quota to private 
individuals by holding an auction where rights are allocated on a 
"competitive" basis to bidders who compete on criteria of black economic 
empowerment and previous participation in the industry (Marine Fisheries 
Policy for South Africa, 1997). 
 
Many of these proposed methods of restructuring are seen to favour smaller, 
previously disadvantaged individuals wishing to gain access to the hake 
industry, at the expense of existing members who feel they have a legitimate 
claim to a resource which they have effectively rebuilt over past years.  Many 
recognise redistribution as a necessary process of political reform, presently 
characterising several sectors of the South African economy, but disagree on 
various methods proposed by the White Paper.  A survey was conducted to 
access attitudes towards restructuring of existing quota holders together with 
those attempting to enter the industry (applicants).  To the authors knowledge 
no other local and international work has been done on assessing the opinions 
of commercial fishery participants faced with the problem of restructuring.  The 
paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications of results obtained. 
 
2.  COMMON OWNERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
 
Fisheries management is not only responsible for providing a sustainable 
resource, but also achieving economically efficient utilisation of the present 
resource, within the realms of a socially equitable framework.  Gordon (1954), 
observed that the question was no longer whether fishery resources needed to 
be managed, but rather which managements strategy was best suited to a 




According to Wilen (1992), the biological control method of setting a TAC, or 
upper limit, on the quantity of fish harvested in a particular season, is the 
minimum standard to which a management regime ought to be held.  Arnason 
(1992a), goes further to say that the TAC method works well to protect fish 
stocks but is economically unsuccessful at obtaining the efficient harvesting of 
fish stocks. 
 
Access restrictions, in the form of licenses, result in "capital stuffing" (the 
enlarged fishing power of vessels) in a race to catch available fish stocks 
(Waters, 1991).  Consequently, access restrictions are not seen as an 
economically viable solution to fishery management.  Input restrictions, as 
opposed to access restrictions, aim to control the method of fishing and not the 
number of fishing units.  However, potential gains from input restrictions, in 
the biological sphere, are eroded by having to control the use of all inputs, to 
avoid making the use of one input more attractive than another (Campbell and 
Haynes, 1990).  There are a variety of different regulatory measures aimed at 
restricting specific inputs, such as: 
 
•  limiting methods of harvesting, 
•  closing certain sensitive areas and seasons,  
•  limiting types of gear (mostly in the form of limitations on nets and mesh 
size), and  
•  limiting total effort expelled on fishing (often in the form of labour 
limitations).   
 
All these methods have an inherent weakness in that any limitation can simply 
be avoided, and the identical outcome obtained, by changing the resource mix 
in favour of a non-restricted input.  Access restrictions and input restrictions 
create an ever-increasing spiral of management needs in an effort to close 
loopholes uncovered by fishers.  Each regulatory adjustment offers temporary 
relief to fish stocks, but over time, additional effort will create the need for still 
more restrictions (Waters, 1991). 
 
Crutchfield (1961), maintains that taxes are theoretically the ultimate technique 
to ensure efficient utilisation of resources.  In theory, a tax exactly equivalent to 
the unpaid resource rent, would make private factor costs equal to social costs 
(Cassidy, 1973).  Determining the precise magnitude of such a tax would 
however require vast amounts of information, with authorities having to solve 
the social optimality problem as well as each firm's profit maximising function 
(Arnason, 1990).  Fishers as well as politicians dislike the idea of taxes, and for 
this reason, along with high administrative costs, taxes are not seen as a viable 




Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been widely heralded as the future 
in fishery management (Christy, 1973; Moloney & Pearse, 1979; Major, 1991). 
With this technique, an annual TAC is set and then divided up amongst quota 
holders according to the proportion of quota held by the individual or 
company.  Quota holders then allocate their time and capital in the most cost 
effective manner, taking their share of the TAC at minimum cost (Hanneson, 
1992a).  By making quota transferable, it ensures the TAC is taken at the 
socially optimal level, as quota gravitates from less efficient to more efficient 
users (Randall, 1981). 
 
The ITQ method of management has been successfully applied in New 
Zealand, where variable ITQs were allocated in perpetuity, according to past 
performance (Boyd & Dewees, 1991 and Annala, 1996).  ITQs were however, 
initially allocated as a specific tonnage, but incorrect stock assessments forced 
government to later change to a proportional allocation system as the New 
Zealand government had to buy back excess quota at a cost of NZ$ 45 million. 
The flexibility of ITQs has also been used to buy quota (which is then deemed 
non-transferable) to settle Maori claims on historic fishing rights (Bergh & 
Barkai, 1993).  In Chile, rights to fish certain resources are allocated by 
auctioning ITQs.  A certain percentage of the ITQ then relapses to the 
government each year and must be repurchased.  These ITQs may be divided, 
transferred, sold and rented (Bergh and Barkai, 1993).  In Australia, ITQs are 
issued according to a formula that takes into account both past performance as 
well as investment commitments.  In both Australia and New Zealand, quota is 
initially distributed free of charge, and there is limited taxation of catches or of 
quota held.  In New Zealand, previous plans to impose a resource rent tax have 
been shelved, and the fishery now pays only a small percentage of what it costs 
to manage.  In Australia, it is a stated policy objective that the fishery should 
pay for its own management (Hanneson, 1992b).  The Netherlands has adopted 
an ITQ system whereby individual vessels are issued quota and these rights are 
then transferable with the vessel (Symes & Crean, 1995).  In Iceland quota is 
allocated according to past performance by means of two formats: 
 
•  According to a vessel's catch in a certain base year, or  
 
•  the vessel's average share of the TAC over a three year period prior to ITQ 
introduction.   
 
Quota share is permanent, divisible and fully transferable (Arnason, 1992b).  In 
Norway the TAC is divided between two groups: 




•  vessels which exceeded a certain catch in one of the preceding three years 
are issued quota according to the size of their vessel (smaller vessels benefit 
from the system), and  
 
•  vessels not exceeding a certain catch are included into a group which fish 
from a common quota (Hanneson, 1992b). 
 
Achieving a sustainable management policy is in itself a difficult task, with all 
the above management alternatives applicable to specific fishery characteristics. 
South Africa's major fisheries currently operate under a system of individual 
quotas and this system has been particularly successful in rebuilding depleted 
hake stocks.  However, determining who is entitled to these rights and how 
they should be allocated so as to be equitable and fair to all parties, is a 
monumental task.  Information on the latter is provided in this study. 
 
3.  DATA SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
 
The 1997 Hake Quota Register, as well as a register of unsuccessful quota 
applicants was obtained from the Department of Sea Fisheries.  Sixteen quota 
holders and 25 unsuccessful applicants were then sampled by means of a postal 
survey, on aspects regarding restructuring. 
 
Data revealed that the size of allocation differed vastly amongst quota holders 
and can be broken up as follows; three respondents received less than 200 tons, 
eight between 200 and 499 tons, two between 500 and 999 tons, and three in 
excess of 1000 tons.  Those companies who receive in excess of 1000 tons also 
harvest the majority of the hake catch, thereby causing an imbalance in the 
f i s h e r y ,  w i t h  f i v e  c o m p a n ies (three of which replied to the questionnaire) 
dominating the hake industry. 
 
Fifty percent of quota holders (n = 16), indicated quota should be allocated as a 
percentage of TAC, whereas 83 percent of applicants (n = 23) advocate a fixed 
tonnage system, where tonnage allocated does not vary from year to year in 
line with fish stock fluctuations.  Applicant support for a fixed tonnage system 
may be representative of a minimum threshold tonnage below which small 
operators would not survive the ill effects of poor years. 
 
Quota holders and applicants stated a preference for quota with a longer term 
of tenure, with only ten percent of all respondents (n = 29) supporting the 
present one year tenure period.  Preference for a longer tenure period can be 
attributed to large investments in resource assessments, harvesting and 




Opinions regarding the accumulation of quota for reallocation to new 
participants are presented in Table 1.  Sixty two percent of quota holders and 59 
percent of applicants support rapid reallocation of quota (within five years).  It 
was expected that existing quota holders would opt for a gradual change to the 
present quota allocation structure from which they benefit. These figures 
however, seem to indicate the contrary.  This is due however, to responses from 
quota holders being dominated by small to medium size operators who 
constitute the majority of the quota register, but receive only a small proportion 
of the quota.  Data show this subset, together with applicants, to be unsatisfied 
with the substantial proportion of quota presently held by a few large 
companies.  This seems to indicate that policy makers have the support of all 
existing quota holders to reallocated quota to smaller operators, but special 
consideration needs to be given to companies currently holding quota who 
voluntarily held back on past catches to allow stocks to recover and have 
invested heavily in exploring new resources.  These companies should not be 
penalised for their efforts, and any policy should take into account any past 
conservation and investment (Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, 1996). 
 
Table 1:  Quota  holder and applicant opinion on methods of 
accumulating quota for reallocation to new entrants, 1997 
 
Method of Accumulating Quota for 
Reallocation 
Quota Holders 
(n = 16) 
Applicants 
(n = 23) 
 Frequency  %  Frequency %  
Once-off percentage decrease  5 62  10 59 
Percentage decrease over 1 to 5 years  5    4   
Percentage decrease over 6 to 10 years  0  0  5 20 
Wait for TAC to increase  6  38  4 16 
 
According to Table 2, (a five category scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 
'strongly agree' with the statements given, was used to elicit the intensity of 
respondents' opinions), 94 percent of quota holders and 92 percent of applicants 
support the self-utilisation of quota being a prerequisite for allocation. This 
concept, which is again advocated by the White Paper, has been policy in the 
past, but has not always been strictly enforced.  Attitudes towards the issuing 
of 'paper' quota (quota not utilised directly by holder), which is in essence the 
opposite of self-utilisation, were therefore also examined, and opposed by all 
quota holders and 68 percent of applicants.  This further emphasises support 
for the enforcement of self-utilisation. 




Table 2:  Initial methods and conditions of allocation to quota holders and 
new entrants, 1997 
 
   Strongly 
Agree 
Agree  Neutral  Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Government regulation, 
where government or 
allocation board issues 
quota to quota holders 
who must use quota 
themselves in order to 
qualify for allocation 
Quota 
holders 
11 4 0 0  1 
   94 %      
 Applicants  16 6 1 1  1 
   92 %      
Auction quota to 
everyone, and successful 
bidders are then 




0 1  1  6 8 
         93 % 
 Applicants  1 1  1  8 14 
         92 % 




4 1  0  6 5 
         69 % 
 Applicants  1 2  0  4 18 
         88 % 
 
Ninety-three percent of quota holders and 92 percent of applicants opposed 
auctioning quota to everyone, while auctioning quota to new entrants only was 
opposed by 69 % of quota holders and 88 % of applicants (Table 2).  The high 
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a p p l i c a n t s  opposed to auctioning quota was contrary to prior 
expectation.  It was hypothesised that those applicants unable to acquire quota 
via present allocation channels would opt for a system where quota was 
auctioned in a free and open market.  These figures suggest that White Paper 
proposals to implement a bidding system, where small operators may purchase 
rights on a short-term basis, may encounter resistance. 
 
4. QUOTA  MARKET  ACTIVITY 
 
No permanent transfers of quota have taken place in recent years, however 
rental transfers are common (Fourie, 1997).  In 1995 and 1996, five major deep 
sea trawl operators caught 87 percent and 85 percent respectively, of the total 




Quota holders indicated 1997 quota was renting for prices ranging from 
R1.75/kg to R1.90/kg (mean = R1.84/kg) (n = 8), a figure which is consistent 
with information received from telephonic and personal interviews conducted 
with industry members (See Figure 1, distance BC).  This figure combined with 
151 701 tons of hake allocated in 1997 (distance OG), amounts to R279 million in 
annual hake quota rents (area ABCD).  Figure 1 is adapted from Doeringer & 












Figure 1:  Demand for hake quota and quota rents in South Africa, 1997 
 
The difference between private ownership and common ownership of a 
r e s o u r c e  i s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1 .   The optimal level of utilisation from 
society's point of view (OG), occurs under private ownership where (marginal 
cost) MC = VMP (value of marginal product).  At this point, an additional unit 
of cost yields an equivalent unit of revenue.  It is not known whether the current 
allocation of 151701 tons is more or less than the optimum level (OG in Figure 
1).  For illustrative purposes this quota allocation is shown at the optimum level 
in Figure 1, with quota rent being the vertical difference between the VAP and 
VMP curves. In the absence of control, the open access (or uncontrolled common 
ownership) result prevails, where MC = VAP (value of average product) and OI 
units of the resource are harvested.  At this point, no individual harvester is able 
to extract any share of rent generated by an efficiently managed fishery and 
therefore has no incentive to conserve the resource by reducing harvesting 
effort.  Therefore an open access fishery will over time gravitate towards point I, 
which may be beyond the maximum sustainable yield, point H (Doeringer & 
Terkla, 1995). 
 
5.  FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
RESTRUCTURING THE HAKE QUOTA MARKET 
 
Factor analysis was used primarily to identify relationships amongst variables 


























Eigen Value  3.361  2.771  1.785  1.588 
Percentage Correlation Explained  24.0  19.8  12.7  11.3 
Auction quota to everyone (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  0.427  0.487  -0.001  0.159 
Grandfathering (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  0.637  0.146  -0.301  0.356 
Lower initial purchase price, followed by higher annual levies (0 = Disagree; 
1 = Agree) 
-0.112  -0.354  0.266  0.625 
Gradual decrease in quota allocation to existing quota holders (0 = Disagree; 
1 = Agree) 
0.427  0.133  0.443  0.502 
Allocate quota to new entrants free of charge (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  -0.713  0.366  -0.264  -0.140 
Allocate quota to new entrants at a predetermined price (0 = Disagree; 1 = 
Agree) 
0.454  -0.509  0.497  -0.362 
Allocate quota to new entrants by means of auction (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  0.423  -0.539  0.320  0.128 
Issuing of 'paper' quota (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  -0.078  0.655  0.195  0.160 
Regulated quota transfer market for everyone (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  -0.194  0.245  0.422  0.670 
Allow new entrants to lease their quota to other companies (0 = Disagree; 1 = 
Agree) 
0.365  0.690  0.343  -0.223 
Allow new entrants to lease their quota only to control body (0 = Disagree; 1 
= Agree) 
0.478  0.506  0.538  -0.003 
Fixed tonnage system (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)  -0.768  -0.239  -0.017  0.288 
Labour employed (Number of employees)  0.495  0.266  -0.580  -0.098 
Group membership (Quota holder = 0; Applicant = 1)  -0.666  0.580  0.223  -0.010 
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Components that can be meaningfully interpreted lead to a greater 
understanding of the variation in the data.  Factor analysis accomplishes this by 
replacing the set of existing variables with a new set of variables, defined by a 
linear combination of the original variables.  The factors produced are 
uncorrelated, ranked in order of decreasing variance and measure different 
dimensions in the data (Manley, 1994).  The percentage of variation accounted 
for is often rather low in studies of this nature which reflects the complexity of 
the underlying structure, in the sense that it is not readily summarised 
(Crabtree, 1971).  The technique has also been used in other studies of a similar 
nature, viz., Nieuwoudt (1977), Steffens (1983) and Stevens (1986). 
 
Fourteen variables representing varying opinions on restructuring were 
included in the factor analysis.  Four factors, having eigen values greater than 
one, and accounting for 67.9 percent of the variation in the data, were retained.  
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 3. 
 
The first factor represents a set of respondents, defined as applicants, or those 
respondents unable to join the industry under present policy.  This factor 
accounted for 24.0 percent of total variation in the data (Table 3) and gave high 
factor loadings to opinions viewed strongly by these members. Applicants 
seemed concerned with having to compete with established business for quota, 
therefore opposing any form of payment for quota.  Applicants also opted for a 
rapid change to a less regulated system of allocating quota, where quota is also 
allocated as a fixed tonnage as opposed to a proportion of TAC (Table 4). 
 
Table 4:  Applicants attitudes towards aspects of restructuring. 
 
Support:  Oppose: 
(1) the free issuing of quota to new 
entrants 
(2) a fixed tonnage system of allocation 
 
1)  grandfathering 
2)  allocating quota to new entrants at a 
predetermined price 
3)  auctioning quota to everyone 
4)  auctioning quota to new entrants only 
5)  a gradual reduction in quota 
allocation to existing quota holders 
6)  regulated quota transfer markets 
 
The second factor accounted for 19.8 percent of total variation in the data (Table 
3), and assigned high factor loadings to opinions viewed strongly by quota 
holders.  These are respondents who have received quota in the past according 
to historical performance.  They do not wish to see quota reallocated amongst an 
uncontrollable number of smaller operators who often do not have the resources 
to efficiently utilise their allocation.  Hence the strong support for self-utilisation 
and the introduction of a form of payment for quota by new entrants, Agrekon, Vol 37, No 3 (September 1998)  Strydom & Nieuwoudt 
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demonstrated by this group.  Opposition to auctioning quota to everyone was 
expected as these respondents have received quota free of charge in the past 
(Table 5). 
 
Table 5:  Quota holders= attitudes towards aspects of restructuring 
 
Support: Oppose: 
1)  issuing quota to new entrants at a 
predetermined price 
2)  auctioning quota to new entrants 
only 
3)  the self-utilisation of quota 
allocation 
1)  auctioning to everyone 
2)  the issuing of 'paper' quota 
 
The third factor, representing smaller scale respondents, accounted for 12.7 
percent of the total variation in the data (Table 3).  This group, comprising of 
small quota holder and applicants, are unhappy with the present imbalance in 
the quota market.  They wish to see a rapid change to the present allocation 
structure, where those wishing to obtain quota, either for the first time, or to 
expand their present size of operation in the case of current quota holders, could 
do so in an open and free market (Table 6). 
 




1) allocating quota to new entrants at a predetermined price 
2) a gradual reduction in quota allocation to existing quota holders 
3) regulated quota transfer markets 
 
The fourth factor represents larger and longer established quota holders, and 
accounts for 11.3 percent of the total variation in the data (Table 3).  These 
respondents seemed most concerned with the threat of sudden reductions in 
quota allocation and proposed methods of payment for quota (Table 7).  These 
companies have been receiving large allocations of quota in the past, and are 
therefore concerned with the impact restructuring might have on employment 
and international market share and competitiveness (Table 7). 
 
6  DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Applicants' support for a fixed tonnage system as opposed to a variable or 
proportional system of allocation may reflect that a minimum threshold quota 
size exists, below which small operators cannot survive the adverse effects of 
bad years.  Larger, established companies may on the other hand be more Agrekon, Vol 37, No 3 (September 1998)  Strydom & Nieuwoudt 
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capable of absorbing the potential losses.  White Paper intensions to have quota 
revert back to the State over the specified period of the right, may need further 
examination as the beneficial effects of a  l o n g e r  p e r i o d  o f  t e n u r e  m i g h t  b e  
eroded by this practice, hence retarding potential investment in the future 
productivity of the resource. 
 
Table 7:  Larger and longer established quota holders' attitudes towards 
aspects of restructuring. 
 
Support: 
1)  a gradual reduction in quota allocation to existing quota holders 
2)  free quota transfer market 
3)  initial purchase price of quota lower, coupled with higher annual levy 
 
Self-utilisation, as already mentioned, has been a prerequisite for allocation 
under past policy, yet this rule has not been stringently enforced in the past.  If 
quota is grandfathered, then self-utilisation seems the appropriate method, but 
if quota is auctioned, then there seems to be no reason to impose self-utilisation. 
 
The introduction of a culture of payment for a resource that has been utilised 
free of charge for so many years is going to be a difficult task.  Policy makers 
may therefore have to find methods to financially assist new entrants as well as 
current quota holders to purchase quota, and make White Paper proposals of 
issuing quota according to criteria of both economic empowerment add past 




The hake fishery of South Africa, is characterised by a relatively stable (and even 
steadily increasing) fish stock due to effective management in recent years. 
However, due to past political processes, South Africa faces the rather unique 
situation of having to restructure a fishery that is presently performing well in 
both biological and economic terms.  This study offers some economic solutions 
to these problems of restructuring. 
 
Analysis of data collected from a postal survey of existing South African hake 
quota holders and rejected hake quota applicants suggests that distinct 
differences in opinion exist amongst respondents.  Rejected applicants seem 
concerned with having to compete with established business for quota, 
opposing any form of payment for quota.  Applicants also opted for a rapid 
change from the status quo to free and open system of allocation, where quota is 
also allocated as a fixed tonnage as opposed to a proportion of TAC.  Current 
quota holders on the other hand, seem more concerned with issues of self-Agrekon, Vol 37, No 3 (September 1998)  Strydom & Nieuwoudt 
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utilisation and the effect paying for quota might have on present business 
operations.  Another group of respondents defined as smaller scale respondents 
(comprising of both quota holders and applicants) demonstrated they were 
primarily concern with the present imbalance in the industry, where a few large 
companies receive the majority of quota.  These respondents wish to see a rapid 
redistribution of quota, and a move towards a freer and open quota market. 
Analysis also revealed a group defined as larger, longer established quota 
holders who's primary concern seemed to be possible sudden reductions in 
quota allocation and proposed methods of payment for quota.  These companies 
have been receiving large allocations of quota in the past, and are therefore 
concerned with the impact restructuring might have on employment and 
international market share and competitiveness. 
 
It was also calculated that a substantial annual rent of approximately R279 
million is generated by the South African hake industry (1997), which is 
presently harvested free of charge by those issued with quota.  It is stated policy 
of the White Paper to capture these rents, however methods of accomplishing 
this need to be more clear and comprehensive.  Extraction of these rents by the 
State through auctioning should be considered, while a small amount of quota 
could be grandfathered to poor communities.  The equity issue is however 
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